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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
FAILURE OF HUSBAND TO PAY ALIMONY PROVIDED FOR IN
SEPARATION AGREEMENT INCORPORATED IN A DIVORCE
DECREE - CONTEMPT
On Dec. 31, 1927, a decree of alimony was granted Mrs. Hollo-
way. She was allowed, per month, $50.00 for each child and $125.00
for her own support. This decree was based upon a separation agree-
ment entered into by the husband and wife before they began litigation.
The agreement was incorporated in the decree for alimony. The hus-
band defaulted in his payments. In a contempt proceeding he was
ordered to jail. He appealed, claiming his constitutional rights to be
exempt from imprisonment for debt. The supreme court held, quoting
the syllabus, "Contempt proceedings lie against a husband for failure
to pay alimony as provided in a separation agreement which is incorpo-
rated into and made a part of the divorce decree." Holloway v. Hollo-
way, 130 Ohio St. 214, 4 Ohio Op. 156, 198 N.E. 579 (1935)-
To reach this conclusion it was necessary for the court to dispose of
the contention of the defendant that alimony was a debt, imprisonment
for which is forbidden by the Ohio constitution, Article 2, Sec. I5, "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, or mesne or final
process, unless in cases of fraud." The authority to decree alimony is
given the court by Oh. G.C. Sec. I 1991 and correlative statutes. "Such
alimony may be allowed in real or personal property or both, or by
decreeing to her such sum of money payable in gross or installments as
the court deems equitable." Oh. G.C. Sec. 12137 gives the court the
power to punish for contempt "disobedience of, or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, rule, judgment or command of the court or officer."
In the principal case the court reasoned "the right to alimony does not
arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage.
It is not founded upon a contract express or implied, but on the natural
or legal duty of the husband to support the wife. It is the law rather
than the contract which imposes the obligation on the husband." From
this rationalization it concludes in accordance with the great weight of
authority that the husband can be imprisoned for non-payment of ali-
mony. 19 Corpus Juris 282, Sec. 645, 646; Miller's Equity 303, 304;
2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Par. 1092, 837; Schouler on
Marriage and Divorce (6th edition), Par. 1843, 185O, 1853, 1851;
30 A.L.R. 130.
Although a great majority of courts have followed this rule they
base it upon three entirely different major premises: first, as is followed
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by the principal case, "A judgment order or decree for the payment of
temporary alimony possesses different characteristics than an ordinary
debt. .... It is designed to secure the performance of a legal duty in
which the public has an interest." Cain v. Miller, 191 N.W. 704
(Neb.), 30 A.L.R. 125 (1922); second, "It is an allowance in the
nature of a partition of the husband's property of which the wife is
entitled to a reasonable share for her maintenance." West v. West, 126
Va. 696, 1oi S.F. 876 (1920). "The nature and effect of such a
decree is the same as that of a court of equity for the specific perform-
ance of any other act." Lynon v. Lynon, 21 Conn. 184 (I85I);
third, "The imprisonment is not ordered simply to enforce the payment
of the money but to punish for the wilful disobedience of a proper order
of the court." West v. West, supra; accord, Staples v. Staples, 87 Wis.
592, 58 N.W. 1036 (1894).
As a general rule the courts in reaching the conclusions above, have
not taken cognizance of the fact that all alimony is not of the same char-
acter. Upon examination of the cases it is revealed that courts have
awarded several types of alimony, e.g., temporary, pendente lite, ali-
mony payable in installments, gross alimony payable in installments, and
gross alimony payable in a lump sum. The weight of authority holds
that contempt will be for default in any of these types, but Ohio deci-
sions distinguish them. Since the principal case has ignored this unique
Ohio position, in order to understand the Ohio attitude, it is necessary to
examine the prior Ohio cases in the light of the types of alimony for
which contempt is permitted and their influence upon the major prem-
ises above.
For facilitating the discussion of this problem the Ohio cases as well
as related cases may be divided into three categories classified as to the
court's inclination to invoke relief by contempt in the specific type of
alimony decree with which it is confronted.
First group: Decrees for pendente lite, temporary and alimony pay-
able in installments, Kaderabek v. Kaderabek, 3 Ohio C.C. 419, 2 Ohio
C. Dec. 236 (i888); Stewart v. Stewart, 1O Ohio Dec. Reprint 662
(1889); Effingerv. State of Ohio, ii Ohio C.C. 389, 5 Ohio C. Dec.
4o8 (1896); Lumbbering v. State of Ohio, 19 Ohio C.C. 658 (i9oo).
In such types of cases it is not difficult to find justification for contempt
proceedings because a duty can easily be inferred and the court still has
jurisdiction of the parties. Stewart v. Stewart, supra, merits particular
examination. In arriving at its decision, the court drew a distinction
between its conclusion and that of a differently minded Missouri court,
Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866), in which case 'it was held
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that there could be no imprisonment for debt arising out of aliniony.
The Ohio court argued that their holding was not opposed to the
Missouri doctrine because theirs was a case of temporary alimony and
the Missouri court's was one of permanent alimony. Such a distinction
is significant in that it raises the question as to what is the true nature of
a permanent decree of alimony. This question has never been settled
in the State of Ohio by the court of last resort.
Second group: decrees for gross alimony payable in installments,
Myers v. Myers, 3 O.N.P. 162 (1896); Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St.
566, 58 L.R.A. 625, 64 N.E. 567 (1902); Hoffman v. Hoffman,
8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 550 (19o6); Re Frisbie, 27 Ohio App. 290,
6 Ohio Abs. 420 (1927). These cases involve a more difficult problem
in ascertaining the right of a court to enforce by contempt. They raise
the question, after there has been a justification for contempt proceedings
upon the ground of duty, as to whether the court still retains jurisdic-
tion after the awarding of alimony, and if it does, does the amount
awarded in gross alimony exceed the amount which is owed the wife as
a duty? Myers v. Myers decides the first question in the affirmative.
The court claims that the decree is not a final judgment, but "an order
of the court legally and lawfully made" and can therefore be punishable
by contempt. Hoffman v. Hoffman allows the theory of duty to suffice.
The court in Cook v. Cook, the leading case in Ohio on the subject of
contempt for default in alimony payments, in order to answer the ques-
tions, started out upon the theory of duty. Alimony, the opinion reads,
"is not a debt in the sense of pecuniary obligation; it arises from a duty
which the husband owes the public as well as the wife; but it is not upon
any specific contract, nor is the proceeding in which the adjudication is
had a civil action." However, the court found differently in rationaliz-
ing attachment for contempt for non-payment of alimony over the
amount which the court usually awards the wife for support on the
theory of a husband's duty to support the wife. Mr. Justice Spear, on
this point says, "Beyond this [duty owed by husband to the wife] the
provision for alimony is an allowance. It is in the nature of a partition."
He considers the assets of the husband as "accumulations which are
presumably the result of the joint effort and joint economies" of the
husband and wife. As a result the decree rendered considers this fact
as well as the property "which may have come to the husband by mar-
riage." He adds "the law wisely awards the wife a just and equitable
portion in real or personal property or both or money payable in gross
installments." He reasons that alimony is not a debt to the wife nor
damages but part of the estate in which she has a share. It follows, then,
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that "'withholding this allowance" can be punished by contempt "for
the same reasons and upon the same ground that orders and decrees of
the court of equity in injunction and the like are enforced." Such a
conclusion would allow the enforcement of the decree by contempt even
if it were not based upon the theory of duty, that is, if the court still has
jurisdiction. This can be granted because the alimony to be paid is to
be paid in installments, by an order of the court. This court seems then
to draw a fine distinction between alimony as a support for the wife and
alimony as a share of the husband's assets.
Third group: decrees for gross alimony payable in a lump sum;
Hart v. Hart, i O.N.P. 56, I Ohio Dec. 94 (1894); In Re TWhallon,
6 Ohio App. 8o, 26 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 167 (1915). This type has
not been considered in a supreme court decision in Ohio. In Re Whal-
Ion the court allowed the imprisonment, but did not discuss its reasons,
its conclusion being based upon Cook v. Cook, supra, and Lumbbering
v. State of Ohio, supra, neither of which can be used to support the
decision. On the other hand Hart v. Hart stands for the opposite propo-
sition. Ohio Jurisprudence has adopted this view, 9 Ohio Jur. 99:
"But it is not consistent with Ohio legislation upon the subject of divorce
and alimony judgments and orders to enforce the payment of judgment
for money in gross by contempt proceedings." This statement is ques-
tionable in that it is still undecided by the Supreme Court. Judge Ong
in Hart v. Hart constructs his argument upon the proposition that a
decree in gross is a final judgment and not an order of the court, Oh.
G. C. I 1582, "A judgment is the final determination of the rights of
a party in an action. A direction of a court made or entered in writing
and not included in a judgment, is an order," therefore the court can
not be clothed with jurisdiction to direct the payment of the judgment
or in default commit for contempt. He reasons further that the Ohio
legislature has provided another remedy for the enforcement of all
judgments for payment for money only, which is in addition to execu-
tion when the execution is returned unsatisfied. "Proceedings may be
instituted under our statutes called a proceeding in the aid of execution,
where a full and complete investigation can be had, the husband re-
quired to disgorge and expose all his property that he might have there-
fore concealed from execution and his failure to comply with the order
of the court to appear and thus submit to an examination, may be sum-
marily dealt with and punished as of contempt." The judge concludes,
therefore, it is not in harmony with legislative intent to enforce alimony
in gross by contempt.*
* It is significant to note that J. Ong decided the case of Myers v. Myers,
which was a case of alimony in gross payable in installments in which was
allowed imprisonment for contempt.
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For the consideration of other Ohio cases which may reflect light
upon the statements of Hart v. Hart, an Indiana case in point, Marsh
v. Marsh, 162 Ind. 210, 70 N.E. 154 (1903) affords a point of
departure. This court does not permit a decree for alimony in gross to
be enforced by contempt, but it declares it must be enforced by execu-
tion. The court terms alimony named by statute "an allowance." It is
not the alimony of common law, which existed until the death of the
husband based upon the fact that marriage existed until death. It is
alimony under a statute and is only an equitable settlement between the
parties. Such gross allowance is given "on the theory that thenceforth
the parties were to be strangers to each other." Similar conclusions are
reached in an early Ohio case, Petersine v. Thomas, 28 Ohio St. 596
(0874). This was a case in which the wife wanted to increase her
gross alimony. It concludes that the statute contemplates a final separa-
tion in divorce. The parties are "to each other as strangers." When
the discretionary power of the court has been fully exercised the case
is at an end, "exhausted" and where she is given a divorce and alimony
in gross she is deemed to have the just and equitable share of her hus-
band's estate. However, the court recognizes that it may decree alimony
in installments and modify the decree at a future time. This case infers,
then, that alimony in lump sum is a final judgment. This is the first
step in the solution of the problem raised in the Hart case. From other
Ohio cases bearing upon this subject, the same conclusion can be drawn;
Cooper v. Cooper, 24 Ohio St. 488 (1874). This case held that the
claim of the wife for alimony in gross was that of "a judgment cred-
itor." Olney v. IVatts 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N.E. 354 (1885) held that
a party receiving alimony in gross payable in installments may obtain a
modification of the decree. Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452,
15 N.E. 471 (1887), followed the Olney case but it involved the modi-
fication of a decree for support of a minor child. Conrad v. Everich, 50
Ohio St. 476, 35 N.E. 58, (1893), in which it was contended by the
plaintiff that alimony in gross was not a debt, held, nevertheless, that a
decree will operate per se as lien on lands. In addition it considered a
duty to be the foundation of the debt. Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566,
quotes this case stating that it is not authority for the proposition that
alimony is a debt. This court interprets this case to mean that a wife
not only has the remedy of contempt but also all the remedies of an
ordinary debtor. In Julier v. Julier, 62 Ohio St. 90, 56 N.E. 661
(9oo), a case involving the payment of gross alimony in installments,
the opinion stated "The judgment cannot be impeached, except by
direct proceedings to reverse or annul it"; Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St.
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369, 6o N.E. 560 (i9oi), held that where alimony is adjudged to a
wife on a separation agreement it cannot be modified after term. The
court considered the case of Olney v. Watts, supra, and quoted with
approval Petersine v. Thomas, supra; DeWitt v.DeWitt, 67 Ohio St.
34o, 66 N.E. 136 (1902), approves Petersine v. Thomas. (This
decision was concurred in by Justice Spear who wrote the opinion in the
Cook case); Hassaurek v. Maikbreit, 68 Ohio St. 554, 67 N.E. io66
(903), required the husband's estate to pay alimony in installments, as
set out in an agreement incorporated in a decree, for the life of the wife.
The court quoted with approval Petersine v. Thomas, Julier v. Julier,
and Law v. Law, Fickel v. Granger, 83 Ohio St. 101, 93 N.E. 527
(191o) stood for the proposition that the wife's creditors previous to
marriage separation have no claim on the alimony paid to the wife, hold-
ing that "It is not the property of the wife recoverable as debt, damage,
or penalty." Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83 Ohio St. 265, 94 N.E. 44 (1911),
stated "A decree for alimony payable in installments in a suit for ali-
mony alone in one state will not support an action as a final judgment
for a fixed sum of money in another state." It "was not a judgment in
the strict meaning of the term, but was such an order as was continu-
ously subject to modification." In Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 420,
28 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 423 (i918), it was held "When a gross sum
is allowed the courts generally recognize it as in full satisfaction of all
claims, and regard the award so made as final; and the awarding
court's jurisdiction at an end. Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290, Stratton v.
Stratton, 73 Me. 481, Mitchel v. Mitchel, 2o Kan. 665, Kamp v.
Kamp, 59 N.Y. 212." It also held that the court has no jurisdiction
to modify at a subsequent term: Meister v. Day, 20 Ohio App. 224, 151
N.E. 736 (1925), concluded that alimony for a fixed sum payable in
installments will not support an action for a money judgment. By
dictum the court said the remedy is to seek modification of the order for
alimony by reducing it to a lump sum. If the reasoning of this court
were followed, the only remedy for payment of alimony in installments
would be by contempt, since it can not be sued upon as a debt. This
case would also lead to the conclusion that alimony payable in a lump
sum was a debt: Corbett v. Corbett, 36 Ohio App. 321, 173 N.E. 316
(1930) by dictum stated that the court has power to modify payments
in installments because it has continuing jurisdiction. It is apparent,
therefore, that there is authority for the assumption that an award for
alimony in lump sum is a final judgment over which the court has lost
jurisdiction to deal with further. It follows, therefore, that there can
be no imprisonment for default, and the Hart case is substantiated.
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Upon the precise subject of alimony payable in lump sum there has
been no decision in the country directly in point, except the Indiana case
cited and a Tennessee case. The decree in that case was for $32,800.
This court declared that there were better reasons for employing con-
tempt in the case of gross alimony than in cases of other types of alimony,
"for judgment for alimony in gross is made upon the finding of the
court of the present value of the husband's property," and the husband
having such ability should be judged contemptuous if he refuses to pay,
Brown v. Brown, 4 S. W. (2nd) 345 (1928). This court quotes Cook
v. Cook, supra, which, as has been shown, is not in point. It also cites
Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 184 (1853). That case decides that the
decree is similar to a decree for partition and therefore can be enforced
by contempt. However, the Tennessee court does not consider the
argument that when the court has given alimony in a lump sum it loses
jurisdiction and therefore can not enforce by contempt. The court does
make the statement, nevertheless, that the contempt "is merely a supple-
mental process by which the court endeavors to enforce its iudgment."
To substantiate its conclusion it quotes from a United States Supreme
Court case, Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 49 L. Ed. 390, 25
Sup. Ct. Rep. 172 (1904), in an opinion written by Justice Day. In
this case the plaintiff insisted, since there was no reservation of right
to change or modify the decree, it was an absolute judgment beyond
the power of the court to alter or amend and therefore should be dis-
charged in bankruptcy proceedings. The court quotes Audubon v. Shie-
feldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. Ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735 (90),
for the proposition that alimony is founded on the natural and legal duty
of the husband to support the wife. Justice Day agrees and proceeds
one step farther and concludes that the fact that alimony is a final
judgment does not change this essential character of the liability or
determine that a claim for alimony is a debt arising out of contract.
"The court having power to look behind the judgment, to determine
the nature and extent of the liability, the obligation enforced is still of
the same character, not withstanding the judgment." The conclusion
follows that if one looks behind the judgment and finds the duty, even
though it is a final judgment, it is not a debt arising out of contract.
A court might conclude as did the Tennessee court then that alimony
in lump sum not being a contract debt can be enforced by contempt.
Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56
N.E. 1025, 5i L.R.A. 86o (9oo).
On all types of alimony the Missouri courts are contra to the doc-
trine that there can be imprisonment for default, Coughlin v. Coughlin,
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supra; McMakin v. McMakin, 68 Mo. App. 57 (1896); in re Floyd
Kinsolving, 135 Mo. App. 631, 116 S.W. io68 (19o9); Francis v.
Francis, 192 Mo. App. 710, 179 S.W. 975 (1915).
In summary, the majority of the courts of the country permit attach-
ment for contempt upon default regardless of the type of alimony
awarded. They invoke the following theories: (I) disobedience of a
legal duty, (2) disobedience of a final equitable decree, (3) disobedi-
ence of an order of the court. Missouri courts are contra. Indiana is
contra as to payment of gross alimony in lump sum upon the theory of
legislative intent. Ohio is in accord with the majority as to all types of
alimony except alimony in lump sum. This type has not yet been the
subject of a supreme court decision. In considering this problem the
court has a choice between the alternatives, (x) alimony in lump sum
is a final judgment over which the court has lost jurisdiction, therefore
it has no power to punish the defaulter in contempt proceedings, (2) as-
suming alimony in lump surfi is a final judgment, the court will look
behind the judgment, see the duty, take jurisdiction and enforce by
imprisonment.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH
EVIDENCE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A CITY ORDINANCE - STATUS IN RE-
VIEWING COURT
In the original action, a suit to replevy an automobile, the Munici-
pal Court of Cincinnati took judicial notice of Section 74-136 of the
ordinances of Cincinnati. On petition in error, the Court of Appeals
for Hamilton County, in affirming the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, stated that the original trial being in the Municipal Court,
the city ordinances were matters of which that court and all succeeding
courts considering the case must take judicial notice. Jackson v. Cope-
Ian, 50 Ohio App. 414, 198 N.E. 596, 3 Ohio Op. 223, 19 Abs. 663
(1935).
One group of jurisdictions in the United States has held that a
reviewing court which would not in an original action take judicial
notice of a municipal ordinance, will not take judicial notice of the
ordinance on reviewing a judgment of a court which did take judicial
notice thereof, unless authorized by statute to do so. Otherwise, the
ordinance can be made known to the court only by being made a part
of the record. State v. Egli, 41 Idaho 422, 238 P. 514 (1925);
